Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

State Dept. review completed

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

82 7742036 SCO PAGE 002 NC 7742036
TOR: 021910Z JAN 82

EO 12065: GDS 1-2-88 (MEEHAN, FRANCIS J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR PINT PL
SUBJ: POLISH SITUATION

REF: WARSAW 12543

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS THAT JARUZELSKI IS CLAMPING THE LID ON TIGHT AND INTENDS TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. MARTIAL LAW WILL LAST FOR SOME MONTHS AT LEAST. THE REGIME IS CUTTING HARD AT SOLIDARITY'S BASE, AND IT MAY THINK IT CAN AFFORD TO LET TIME WORK TO SOFTEN UP WALESA. IT IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS TO SOLIDARITY WHICH WOULD GIVE IT A MAJOR VOICE IN THE COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS. THE CHURCH IS ADJUSTING TO THE NEW DISPENSATION. JARUZELSKI'S TO-BE-ANNOUNCED PROGRAM WILL PROBABLY EMPHASIZE THE ECONOMIC SIDE, AND ECONOMIC MEASURES ALREADY IN TRAIN SHOW THAT HARD TIMES LIE AHEAD. JARUZELSKI GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF BEING WILLING TO APPLY DISCIPLINE, HARD WORK, AUSTERITY, BUT WITH A DISAFFECTED WORK FORCE ADDED TO EXISTING DIFFICULTIES, BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL REMAIN, WITH IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL TROULBE RECURRING. POLES WILL HUNKER DOWN FOR A TIME.

3. DESPITE CONTINUING PROBLEMS, POST-DEC 13 POLAND IS MUCH MORE SECURE FOR MOSCOW THAN IT WAS BEFORE. THE RUSSIANS MAY WANT A RETURN TO NORMAL PARTY CONTROL, AND THEY MAY BE SUSPICIOUS OF THE NATIONAL POLISH ELEMENT IN JARUZELSKI, BUT BOTH POINTS ARE PROBABLY MANAGEABLE FOR THEM. THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE POLAND, AND UNLESS THEY HAVE SOMEONE BETTER THAN JARUZELSKI TO DO THE JOB, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR THEM NOT TO FORCE THE PACE ON HIM TOO MUCH FOR A RETURN TO A NORMAL PARTY SITUATION.

4. I COULD NOT REPEAT NOT PRETEND TO SEE ANYTHING SO FAR IN WHAT JARUZELSKI HAS DONE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN EASIER USG POLICY TOWARD HIM. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAIN GENERAL POINTS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WE REVIEW FURTHER ZAP OPTIONS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MORE ZAP WILL DIVERT HIM FROM HIS PURPOSES. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

5. THE SIGNS HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATING IN THE WEEK SINCE REFTEL WAS WRITTEN THAT JARUZELSKI HAS CLAMPED A VERY TIGHT LID INDEED ON POLAND AND INTENDS TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THRUSDAY THAT THE LOCAL NATIONAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS DUE TO BE HELD IN FEBRUARY WILL BE POSTPONED UNTIL THEY CAN TAKE PLACE "IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF SOCIAL PEACE," AND THAT PRESENT NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OFFICE DURING THE PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW INDICATES THAT THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE REMOVED FOR SOME MONTHS AT LEAST.

6. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE REGIME INTENDS A RETURN TO RENEWAL IN ANY SENSE THAT WOULD GIVE SOLIDARITY A MAJOR VOICE IN THE COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS. JARUZELSKI PROBABLY MEANS IT WHEN HE SAYS THAT THERE CAN BE NO RETURN TO PRE-AUGUST 1980, BUT THAT IS NOT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SAY AND MEAN. THE SYSTEM WAS WORKING BADLY THEN, CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY WIDESPREAD, AND JARUZELSKI MUST DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE ERROS OF THAT TIME, AS HE IS DOING EXPLICITY BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE TRIBUNAL, IN THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL MOMENTUM.

7. NO-RETURN-TO-PRE-AUGUST-1980 IS, HOWEVER, A LONG WAY FROM GOING BACK TO PRE-DEC. 13. THE ROLE OF SOLIDARITY IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. THE REGIME CONSTANTLY STATES THAT THERE IS A PLACE FOR SOLIDARITY IN THE NEW ORDER, BUT FROM WHAT WE HEAR AND READ IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT ONLY A TAME SOLIDARITY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO IT. WHILE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE REGIME NEGOTIATIONS WITH WALESA AND PERHAPS OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS REMAINS MURKY, THE MARTIAL LAW SYSTEM IS MOVING STEADILY AGAINST SOLIDARITY AT THE GRASS ROOTS COUNTRY-WIDE. THE "VERIFICATION" PROCESSES WE HEAR OF IN FACTORIES, GOVERNMENT OFFICES, THE ACADEMIC WORLD, THE MEDIA, AND CULTURAL LIFE ARE CLEARLY INTENDED TO CUT AWAY THE SOLIDARITY BASE. THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK TO ACCOMPLISH BUT THE REGIME IS GOING AT IT HARD.

8. SOLIDARITY HAS MAINTAINED SOME ACTIVITIES UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE REMNANTS OF THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HAVE ESCAPED DETENTION HAVE SO FAR SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING THE BASIS FOR OPPOSITION: CONTACTS AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH SYMPATHIZERS WHO ARE FREE, AN INFORMATION SERVICE WHICH CAN

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

ISSUE AND DISTRIBUTE CLANDESTINELY SOME BULLETINS, AND A CERTAIN DEGREE OF DISCIPLINE OVER UNION MEMBERS SO THAT THEY

EXDIS

GENERALLY ADHERE TO THE UNION'S POLICY OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNION HAS BEEN GRAVELY WEAKENED. IT HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ASKING POLES TO DO THINGS WHICH THEY WOULD DO ANYWAY -- FROM LIGHTING CANDLES ON CHRISTMAS EVE TO RESISTING WORK ON SATURDAYS -- AND THEN CITING THE RESULTS AS EVIDENCE OF SOLIDARITY'S CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS.

9 OUR CHURCH CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE REGMIE DOES NOT HAVEY ANY BROAD IDEA OF HOW TO PROCEED BEYOND THE INITIAL PHASE OF MARTIAL LAW. THE MILITARY REDUCED THE COUNTRY TO DOCILITY BY MASSIVE SHOCK BUT, THE CHURCH SUGGESTS, THEY HAVE NO CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MOVING FORWARD. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND, THE REGIME IS UNCERTAIN ON HOW TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF FORMING SOME KIND OF NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OR CONSENSUS -- OF WHICH REGIME SPOKESMEN CONTINUE TO SPEAK, ALBEIT IMPRECISELY. CHURCH CONTACTS HAVE DEPICTED SOLIDARITY (WALESA) AS OPPOSED TO DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT CONDITIONS -- THE RELEASE OF HIS ADVISORS AND THE SOLIDARITY PRESIDIUM, A STEP JARUZELSKI IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO TAKE.

10. I DO NOT REPEAT NOT AGREE WITH SOME OF THESE CHURCH VIEWS. THE REGIME HAS, I BELIEVE, A CLEAR, RELATIVELY SIMPLE OBJECTIVE, NAMELY TO NEUTRALIZE ANY AND ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES OF OPPOSITION. I AM INCLINED TO THINK THE REGIME IS STRINGING THE CHURCH ALONG, AND FOR ITS OWN REASONS THE CHURCH BELIEVES IT HAS TO GO ALONG WITH THE REGIM'S TERMS OF PLAY. AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED (WARSAW 12397), THE CHURCH SEEMS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE THESIS THAT MARTIAL LAW WAS THE LESSER EVIL, THE GREATER ONE BEING RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHURCH FEELS IT CAN LIFE WITH THE SITUATION WITHOUT TOO MUCH DISCOMFORT. IT HAS LIVED WITH WORSE SITUATIONS IN THE PAST AND SURVIVED THEM, COMING OUT STRENGTHENED IN THE END, AND IT IS, I IMAGINE, WORKING HARD TO SEE HOW IT IS GOING TO LIVE WITH THE POST-DEC 13 DISPENSATION. TO REPEAT A POINT

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

MADE BEFORE: THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE CHURCH IS IN THE REGIME'S POCKET. IT WILL PURSUE ITS OWN INTERESTS, WHICH HAVE OFTEN IN THE PAST BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST, UNDER THE NEW REALITIES. FOR THE MOMENT, IN ANY CASE, IT IS CALLING FOR PEACE AMONG POLES AS THE PARAMOUNT GOAL, AND THE REGIME, IT IS CLEAR, FINDS THE CHURCH'S POSITION USEFUL FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES.

11. WALESA PROBABLY REMAINS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN REGIME CALCULATIONS. IF THEY CAN GET HIM TO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF A TAME SOLIDARITY, IT WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE FOR THEM. THEY PRESUMABLY FEEL, WITH REASON, THAT THEY HAVE THE UPPER HAND, AND THEY ARE PERHAPS HOPING TO SOFTEN WALESA UP, EVEN IF IT TAKES SOME TIME TO DO ITE. I DOUBT THAT THEY WILL MAKE ANY GREAT CONCESSIONS TO HIM OR ANYONE ELSE IN SOLIDARITY. THEY MAY BE COUNTING ON WALESA'S VOLATILITY, PERHAPS INCREASED IN CONDITIONS OF SUBSTANTIAL ISOLATION, TO DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM.

12. WE HAVE STILL TO SEE THE "PROGRAM"" JARUZELSKI SAID AT CHRISTMAS WOULD BE COMING OUT SHORTLY. WHEN I SAW DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WIEJACZ THE OTHER DAY I ASKED ABOUT THE PROGRAM, NOT ONLY TIMING BUT SUBSTANCE. ON THE LATTER POINT, WIEJACZ SAID THAT IT WOULD, OF COURSE, NOT BE A COMPLETE PROGRAM, ONLY PARTIAL. I READ FROM THIS THAT THE MAIN STRESS IN THE PROGRAM WILL BE ON TH ECONOMIC SIDE, NOT THE POLITICAL. WE HAVE KNOWN FOR SOME TIME, BEFORE DEC 13, THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORM ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO GO INTO EFFECT AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR WOULD ONLY BE INTRODUCED IN MUCH REDUCED SCOPE THEN, AND IT SOUNDED FROM WIEJACZ'S REMARKS AS IF JARUZELSKI WILL GIVE THE LATEST WARMED-UP VERSIONOF SOME OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE REGIME'S ECONOMIC PLANNING. IT WOULD BE PLEASANT TO BE MISTAKEN AND FIND THE GENERAL COMING OUT WITH A BROAD-BASED POLITICAL PROGRAM WITH OPENING, TRUE OPENINGS, IN A REFORM DIRECTION. WE SHOULD SOON KNOW.

13. MEANTIME THE REGIME HAS MOVED TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS AFFECTING THE ECONOMY, STEPS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE PRE-DEC 13 WITHOUT SOLIDARITY APPROVAL. THE STEEP RISE IN PRICES PAID BY PRODUCERS FOR COA AND OIL ARE DOUBTELESS ECONOMICALLY SOUND. THEY WILL HAVE REPRECUSSIONS IN THE CONSUMER

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

SECTOR WHERE PRICE INCREASES OF VARIOUS KINDS ARE ALREADY IN TRAIN. THE MEAT RATION HAS BEEN CUT. THERE IS INCREASING TALK OF GOING AFTER COMPULSORY DELIVERIES OF FOOD FROM PRIVATE

EXDIS

FARMERS. IN THE BACKGROUND, DECLINGING AVAILABILITY OF MARTIAL SUPPLIES, SEMI-FINISHED PRODUCTS AND SPARE PARTS COMPOUNDS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, AND NOW, ADDED TO THE MESS, IS THE DISAFFECTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE. REFORM OF THE POLISH ECONOMY BEFORE DEC. 13 WAS A DESPERATE UNDERTAKING. IN CURRENT CONDITIONS IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY OUTCOME OTHER THAN FURTHER DROPS IN PRODUCTIVITY AND LIVING STANDARDS.

14. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE POLISH ECONOMY OF MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. HOW EXTENSIVE THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT IT MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE GIVEN THE WORK STOPPAGES (ESPECIALLY IN THE COAL MINES AND SHIPYARDS, TWO DOLLAR-EARNING INDUSTRIES), THE CONTINUING WORK SLOWDOWNS, AND DISLOCATIONS CAUSED BY MARTIAL LAW CONDITIONS, MOST NOTABLY THE ABSENCE OF TELEPHONE AND TELEX SERVICES. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT IN THE LONG RUN MARTIAL LAW WILL ALSO HURT THE ECONOMY BECAUSE A DESAFFECTED WORK FORCE IS AN INEFFICIENT WORK FORCE. AS ONE POLE COMMENTED TO US THE OTHER DAY, "YOU CAN FORCE PEOPLE TO DIG DITCHES; YOU CANNOT FORCE THEM TO DESIGN COMPUTERS."

15. THERE ARE PROBABLY HARD TIMES AHEAD INDEED, BUT JARUZELSKI GIVES ME THE IMPRESSION OF THE SPARTAN. IF HARD TIMES ARE THE PRICE THE COUNTRY HAS TO PAY FOR GETTING BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL POLITICALLY, SO BE IT. HARD WORK, DISCIPLINE, RETURN TO THE SACRIFICE ETHIC--I THINK THESE CALUES COME EASY TO HIM, AND HE WILL NOT DESITATE TO APPLY THEM. IF WESTERN AID DRIES UP, HE WILL BE PREPARED TO LET THE POLISH ECONOMY TURN INWARDS, AS THE CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY WAS DOING DURING MY TIME IN PRAGUE, TOWARD COMECON -- AND LOWER STANDARDS OF TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTION, MARKETING AND CONSUMPTION. AS IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK CASE, THIS WOULD ONLY MEAN THAT STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS ARE SWEPT UNDER THE RUG. THEY WILL NOT DISAPPEAR, BUT WILL SURFACE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE.

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

16. HERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISCERN THE WEAKNESS OF JARUZELSKI'S COURSE, AT LEAST AS I HAVE GUESSED AT ITS PROBABLE DIRECTION. IN A GENERAL WAY IT IS THAT PROBLEMS ARE NOT SOLVED, MERELY POSTPONED. DISCIPLINE ALONE WILL NOT GET THE POLISH ECONOMY OUTOF THE HOLE. A PERMANENTLY DISAFFECTED INDUSTRIAL WORKING CLASS IS A POOR BASIS FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND IT IS AN ALMOST CERTAIN PRESCRIPTION FOR POLITICAL TROUBLE. ALSO, AND MOST IMPORTANT, THE POLES ARE A STUBBORN PEOPLE. DEC. 13 MAY HAVE STUNNED THEM -- ONE HAS TO ADMIRE THE TECHNICAL SKILL OF THE MARTIAL LAW OPERATION -- BUT THEY WILL NOT REMAIN STUNNED FOREVER. ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S LEADING INTELLECTUALS TOLD US THE OTHER DAY THAT IT WAS TIME NOW TO HUNKER DOWN, PERHAPS FOR AS LONG AS A COUPLE OF YEARS. BUT THEN, HE IMPLIED, NORMAL PROCESSES WOULD BE FLOWING AGAIN. THAT IS POSSIBLY WHAT A LOT OF POLES ARE THINKING.

17. I SAID IN REFTEL THAT POLAND IS A NO-LOSE SITUATION FOR US, IN THE SENSE THAT ANY OF THE THREE LIKELY SCENARIOS (REFTEL PARAS 6-9) WOULD WEAKEN THE RUSSIANS. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS CLEAR THAT POLAND IS MUCH MORE SECURE FOR MOSCOW POST-DEC. 13, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE, THAN IT WAS BEFORE. BREZHEV AND COMPANY'S PATIENCE , OR LACK OF DECISIVENESS, OR MUDDLING THROUGH PAID OFF IN THE END AFTER ALL. INSTEAD OF BEING FACED WITH THE POLITICAL HORROR CHAMBER THAT POLAND HAD BECOME IN THE LAST YEAR, THEY HAVE A NICE, TIGHT, NO-NONSENSE SITUATION WITH THE MAIN IMMEDIATE DANGER, SOLIDARITY, EFFECTIVELY DISPOSED OF. ALL SORTS OF PROBLEMS MAY REMAIN, BUT POLAND IS NO LONGER OUT OF CONTROL, AND THAT IS THE MAIN THING. THE RELIEF IN THE KREMLIN MUST BE CONSIDERABLE.

18. AS TO THE CONTINUING RUSSIAN PROBLEMS WITH POLAND, THESE ARE OF VARIOUS DIMENSIONS. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO SEE A RETURN TO NORMAL PARTY CONTROL, AND THEY MAY BE SUSPICIOUS OF THE NATIONAL POLISH ELEMENT IN JARUZELSKI'S DEC. 13 SOLUTION. I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO PUT TOO HIGH A VALUE ON EITHER POINT, HOWEVER.

19. SO FAR AS THE POLISH PARTY IS CONCERNED, THE ESSENTIAL IS THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW HAVE TIME TO MANIPULATE. THE PARTY MAY BE COMPLETELY SHOT. IT MAY, AS SOME REPORTS SUGGEST, HAVE

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

TO BE REBUILT FROM SCRATCH, PERHAPS DISSOLVED IN ITS PRESENT FORM, RENAMED AND NEW CADRES CREATED. THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY. BUT IT IS THE KIND OF WORK THE RUSSIANS KNOW WELL AND ENJOY (STALIN GOT RID OF THE POLISH PARTY ENTIRELY IN THE THIRTIES).

EXDIS

AND, OF COURSE, JARUZELSKI AND THE GENERALS ARE PARTY MEN THEMSELVES. THEY HAVE EVERY REASON FOR CONTEMPT OF THE NON-MILITARY PARTY PEOPLE'S INEPTNESS, AND THEY PROBABLY HAVE A CERTAIN PROFESSIONAL ESPRIT WHICH TAKES THEM A BIT OUT OF THE NORMAL PARTY CATEGORIES. BUT THEY HAVE NO IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK TO FALL BACK ON OTHER THAN THE PARTY. JARUZELSKI IS NOT PILSUDSKI. I SHOULD THINK THE CHANCES ARE THAT A NORMAL PARTY CONSTELLATION WILL REASSERT ITSELF IN TIME, WITH THE GENERALS MOVING BACK TO MORE TRADITIONAL ROLES.

20. I WOULD NOT IMAGINE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL WANT TO FORCE THE PACE TOO FAST ON JARUZELSKI FOR RETURN TO A NORMAL PARTY SITUATION. THEY OWE HIM A LOT FOR SAVING THEIR BACON IN POLAND--NOT THAT GRATITUDE IS A LONG-LIFE POLITICAL COMMODITY. THE MAIN POINT FOR MOSCOW WILL BE THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE, STABLE POLAND. JARUZELSKI WOULD SEEM LIKELY TO FIGURE IN THEIR CALCULATIONS AS THE ONE MOST CAPABLE OF DELIVERING THAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT IN THE FUTURE. SO LONG AS THEY DO NOT SEE ANYONE BETTER TO DO THE JOB, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR THEM TO LET HIM GO ABOUT HIS BUSINESS IN HIS OWN WAY.

21. ON THE NATIONAL POINT, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A MOTIVATING FACTOR FOR JARUZELSKI, AND THE MILITARY GENERALLY. THE CALIM CANNOT BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND THAT THE GENERAL GENUINELY SAW MARTIAL LAW AS THE LESSER EVIL. HE MAY HAVE FELT THE DRIFT TO CIVIL WAR AND RUSSIAN INTERVENTION INESCAPABLE (I THINK THE PRIMATE AND OTHERS IN THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY ACCEPT THIS THESIS). BUT HISTORICALLY THERE IS A BRAND OF POLISH NATIONALISM WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION, USUALLY BECAUSE OF FEAR OF GERMANY. JARUZELSKI SEEMS TO ME TO FIT INTO THIS MOLD, QUITE APART FROM THE POINT OF HIS IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO THE USSR. I SEE HIM AS A POLE WHO BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO GEOPOLITICAL ALTERNATIVE

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

TO THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION. IF THIS IS SO, HIS NATIONALISM MAY GRATE SOME ON THE RUSSIANS, BUT IT WILL LIKELY BE A MANAGEABLE ELEMENT.

22. POLAND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR MOSCOW OTHER THAN IN THE POLITICAL FIELD. THE POLISH ECONOMY, LIKELY TO BECOME MORE OF A BOLLOX AFTER DEC. 13 THAN IT WAS BEFORE, WILL BE A LIABILITY FOR RUSSIA, AND THE OTHER COMECON COUNTRIES AS WELL. THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO KEEP POLAND GOING. THE ENERGY SECTOR IS THE OBVIOUS CASE IN POINT. POLAND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO RUN UP SUBSTANTIAL TRADE DEFICITS IN ANY CASE, BUT ESPECIALLY IF WESTERN ASSISTANCE FALLS OFF SHARPLY . I WOULD IMAGINE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL HELP, BUT THEY WILL NOT BE OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT DROPS IN POLISH CONSUMPTION AND LIVING STANDARDS. THEY PROBABLY THINK THE POLES HAVE BEEN LIVING TOO HIGH AS IT IS, AND A DOSE OF AUSTERITY AND HARD WORK, FIRMLY ADMINISTERED, WILL DO THEM NO HARM.

23. I SUGGESTED IN REFTEL THAT WE PAUSE IN ZAPPING JARUZELSKI AND, IF WE SAW ANY SIGNS OF POLITICAL DECENCY IN HIM, CONSIDER LETTING THE TIP OF THE CARROT SHOW AGAIN. I COULD NOT PRETEND TO SEE ANYTHING SO FAR IN WHAT HE IS DOING THAT WOULD SUPPORT AN EASIER POLICY TOWARD HIM. MARTIAL LAW WILL NOT REPEAT NOT SOON BE LIFTED. THE ARRESTEES WILL GET OUT ONLY IN DRIBLETS, AND THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINSTS AND PENALTIES. SOLIDARITY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME BACK IN RECOGNIZABLE PRE-DEC. 13 DIMENSIONS. PERHAPS THE JARUZELSKI "PROGRAM" WILL HELP, BUT I DOUBT IT. OF THE THREE SCENARIOS MENTIONED REFTEL, IT IS THE SECOND THAT LOOKS AS IF IT IS ON, AND AS IF IT WILL BE ON FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME.

24. IN CONSIDERING FURTHER POSSIBLE MEASURES AGAINST JARUZELSKI, HOWEVER, CERTAIN GENERAL POINTS APPLY. FIRST, IT WILL BE EASY TO DRIVE HIM FURTHER TOWARD THE RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALWAYS SEEK TO CREATE GAPS, AND FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART IS CONDUCIVE TO THAT END. SECOND, WE SHOULD AVOID AREAS WHERE RECIPROCAL ACTION IS POSSIBLE FOR THE POLES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO HURT US MORE THAN WE HURT THEM.

25. ADDITIONAL PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST JARUZELSKI CAN BE

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

---

82 7742036 SCO PAGE 010 NC 7742036
TOR: 021910Z JAN 82

JUSTIFIED, BUT I DOUBT THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN DIVERTING HIM FROM HIS PURPOSES. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TIGHTEN UP FURTHER, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, LEANING EVEN MORE HEAVILY ON THE RUSSIANS THAN AT PRESENT, IF WE DECIDED TO GO IN THAT DIRECTION.
MEEHAN

END OF MESS

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200410007-3